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Critical II/literacy: 
Humanism, Heidegger, 
Anti-Humanism 
Renate Holub 
1. AGAINST HUMANISM 
Rumor has it that humanism is out and anti-humanism is in. 1 
This, at least, is the feeling one gets while watching the late-twen-
tieth-century contest-of-the-faculties show in the academy. Those 
intellectuals in the humanities who think of themselves as avant-
guarding something of a political consciousness neatly register 
the world of texts under two distinct headings: that which one 
fancies apposite to humanism (traditional humanism, marxist 
humanism, etc.), and that which one fancies affixed, suffixed, or 
prefixed to humanism (pre-humanism, post-humanism, etc.). The 
complexity of difference in discursive formations is conveniently 
reduced to a simple equation: humanism to any power equals 
conservativism squared, whereas the square-root of anti-humanism 
squarely roots infinitesimal liberational power. 
Let me refer you, to get to the point, to a critical discourse 
from the eighties on cultural literacy as it appeared in the 1984/85 
issue of Boundary 2 entitled "Humanism and the Univer-
sity."2 Contrary to the topic announced in its title, the issue deals 
with neither humanism nor the university. And it does not deal 
with the relation of the university to humanism either. Though 
the two volumes, subdivided into "The Discourse of Humanism" 
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and "The Institutions of Humanism," comprise something of a 
thousand pages and almost fifty contributors, humanism is not 
even in one of these contributions cross-culturally or genealogi-
cally considered. Nor is the university considered in terms of its 
complex field of operations in a society dynamically moving to-
wards informatization. The complexity of the "university," with 
its relation of knowledge-production processes to interested 
stratas within the industrial-military-administrative complex, be-
comes reduced in Boundary 2 to the "English Department," and 
"humanism" is ritually reduced to an empty noun which those 
initiated to anti-humanism will fill with a sufficiently amorphous 
conservative content. 3 The noun "humanism" is put from the start 
under such an inexorable anti-humanist siege that its final terminal 
bombing perforates nothing but a wasteland. Resistance to such 
systematic destruction, in the form of counter-argument or 
counter-memory to anti-humanism, is, with the exception of 
Gerald Graff, thoroughly rooted out from the beginning in a pecul-
iar spirit of orthodoxy. A sad ending, if one considers that the 
editor had his heart in the right place when he reacted to the 
report on the humanities by William J. Bennett, who had called 
upon educators to restore to the core curriculum the great canons 
of Western civilization, thereby ignoring the cultural needs of a 
multi-ethnic and multi-class society . That Boundary 2 intervened 
in that unsettling issue of cultural literacy and illiteracy needs to 
go on record . Yet what also needs to go on record are the rhetorics 
of that discourse as presented in Boundary 2. What I would like 
to say is this : the metaphorics emanating from these texts are 
grounded in a formidable workout in phenomenological reduc-
tionism without sufficient reflection on its own life-enhancing 
principle of the negative, and without sufficient reflection on its 
own possible systemic institutional complicity in the preservation 
of a conservative and dangerous status quo . Following relentless 
logics of reductionism, many of the contributors to that issue on 
the discourse on humanism and the university intransigently close 
the door on cross-cultural and political issues before the issue of 
humanism and the university has been examined . 
I will in the following 1) briefly comment on some of the 
reductionist principles that dominate the rhetoric of anti-
humanism, 2) evoke the imagery of desires operating in the sub-
textuality of that gesture (geometry over history), and 3) propose 
the minimal contours of a possible alternative to reductionism, 
the contours of a literacy of differentiation, which those in the 
business of critical literacy might want to take into consideration. 
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2. LOGICS OF ANTI-HUMANISM 
Many of the stories in this anthology on humanism are told 
by members of the "English Institute." A stray philosopher, a 
political scientist, a sociologist, or a theologian was allowed to 
join the ranks here and there, yet only if that voice melodiously 
carried the anti-humanism tune. Transmitters of knowledge from 
other fields-from physics or biology, or perhaps from economy 
or ecology-were denied, so it appears, any possibility of trans-
gression. At first sight, when comparing the historical trajectories 
of educational policy structures of a variety of nations, this bias 
makes sense. Problems of cultural literacy naturally tend to receive 
more attention from that intellectual community which works in 
the context of the national language and literature in question. 
So that the "English Institute" should enlist itself in that march 
against Bennett is not without precedent. Indeed, it keeps with 
a tradition. After all, supporters of Bennett originate in that com-
munity as well-Allan Bloom with his The Closing of the American 
Mind, for instance. But who or what compels the "English Insti-
tute" to fetishize that tradition, to exclude members from "foreign" 
fields of knowledge in an era (let us call it postmodern for lack 
of a more convenient term) in which the formation and control 
of cultural literacy, as well as illiteracy, is related to interstructural 
decentralizations that lie far beyond the domain and reach of the 
"English Institute," while simultaneously exerting systemic pres-
sures (significant curtailment of funding, etc.) on the formation 
of that institute? So why does the "English Institute" cultivate-
without much self-reflection on the marginal space it inhabits next 
to the social sciences and the hard sciences in the context of the 
university-the image of self-appointed leadership on issues 
which concern the intellectual and social community at large? 
Why does it display recurrent bouts of xenophobia when it comes 
to hard scientists, to economists, to computer scientists, to 
ecologists, or to information technologists? And yet, these rather 
alarming symptoms of xenophobia mysteriously disappear when 
intransigent opponents to "humanism" are concerned, such as 
Heidegger . 
The "anti-humanist" discourse on humanism and the univer-
sity, as response to Bennett's response to the literacy crisis, takes 
place in the "English Institute" and Heidegger's letter "Brief iiber 
den Humanismus," written in 1947 to his French friend Jean Beau-
frais who would, a few decades later, cause headlines with his 
declaration that "there was no holocaust." So this letter on 
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humanism becomes the authoritative reference, both in terms of 
its reductionist methodology and its logic of desire, of this rhetoric 
against humanism . 4 A discourse which desires to be a political 
discourse against authority, control, and power, against ethnic 
and cultural underrepresentation in curricula development, that 
discourse chooses the authority of Heidegger's text. This is one 
of the foremost principles of the anti-humanists. I am not in-
terested here in a lengthy rehashing of Heidegger's past, nor in 
the relationship between his past and his philosophy, nor in the 
question of whether his can be a great philosophy when his ethics 
were so despicable. 5 These are questions one has to answer to 
and for oneself. It is in any event easy to find out that Heidegger 
became a Nazi when the power of Nazism enhanced his power 
structure as a university administrator and philosopher (as many 
petit bourgeois tend[ed] to opportunistically adjust to and accom-
modate the wind that blows) and that, when morally and finan-
cially implicated after the war, he skillfully tried to cover up the 
sacrifices he had offered to that regime, mostly in the currency 
of terminating careers of the less fit-in Nazi terms . It is also easy 
to find out that he is a perhaps unsurpassed master in handling 
the German language, and that he has fascinated many a mind 
with his teachings on the possibilities and powers, the impos-
sibilities and powerlessness, residing in language. What seems 
somewhat more problematic is whether Heidegger's metaphysical 
and theological program is by necessity the theoretical authority 
on the basis of which to interrogate the American university and 
its vast and complex operative itinerary at the turn of the twentieth 
to the twenty-first century. Simply because Allan Bloom spouts 
his conservative jeremiads against "the German connection" 6-
against Nietzsche and Heidegger as dangerous extremists who 
relativize the realm of ethical values, who preach elitism and in-
equality over democracy and equality, who embrace creativity 
over rationality, rootedness and provinciality over cosmopol-
itanism-simply because Bloom polemicizes against Heidegger is 
very little reason indeed to polemicize with Heidegger against 
Bloom. Why wage the struggle on oedipal grounds? 
Heidegger's metaphysical authority, when it comes to the 
question of humanism and the university, is a theoretical choice 
that apparently has its advantages. It legitimizes a quite restrictive 
view as to what humanism and anti-humanism are. This helps to 
eliminate the experiences of different forms of humanism from 
the pages of history, such as the complex period of Italian 
humanism, for instance. So in the very act of arguing for a more 
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democratic, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic representation of 
voices which have hitherto been silenced within the discourse on 
humanism and the university, one of the disciplines which has 
traditionally played a rather marginal role in the academy, Italian 
studies, is again, this time thanks to Heidegger's thanking think-
ing, without a voice. 7 In the above mentioned letter, "Brief iiber 
den Humanism us," Heidegger distinguishes, among other things, 
between three terms: homo humanus, humanitas, and 
humanism. 8 The positive terms are the first two, whereas the 
latter, whether in a singular or plural constellation, is a negative 
term. "Gegen den Humanismus wird gedacht, weil er die 
Humanitas des Menschen nicht hoch genug ansetzt" (321). So in 
a typical Heideggerian rhetorical move, a double operation takes 
place in such a statement. By using the passive voice of the German 
language, "wird gedacht," which grammatologically does not re-
quire the agent who or by whom "gedacht wird," which does not 
require, that is, by whom something is being thought or reflected 
upon, agency or a subject or responsibility is being ousted from 
the statement which takes place in history. Simultaneously, in 
the second part of the sentence, which is connected to the first 
part by a good old traditional household principle of causality, 
agency or a subject of responsibility is re-established: "weil er die 
Humanitas des Menschen nicht hoch genug ansetzt," because 
humanism, now an anthropomorphized entity consisting of a will 
and a mind, did not validate highly enough the humanity or the 
"humanitas" of the human being, the "homo humanus." Yet sim-
ply by using the passive voice I am not convinced that it is not 
Heidegger, after all, who thinks against the "Humanismus," 
rather than an unknowable and mysterious force. And what 
Heidegger proposes is that "humanitas" and the "homo 
humanus" are actually constitutive or take part of the same entity, 
of the truth of Being (Wahrheit des Seins). Heidegger believes that 
pre-socratic thinking, an originary form of thinking as he sees it 
in Parmenides and Heraklitus, where "thinking is in its element," 
as he phrases it, is superior to post-socratic forms of thinking, 
Greek classical philosophy that is, particularly as that form of think-
ing entered the Latin language and world, which Heidegger then 
equates with techne or the instrument in education and culture. 
Because Italian humanism or the humanism of the fourteenth to 
the sixteenth centuries is merely an "ism" that reiterates the power 
of that techne, a "renascentia romanitatis" and not a "renascentia 
presocratica," it too belongs to the category that opposes the search 
for the true Being. As such, it is no good in Heidegger's ethics. 
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For in order to "den Menschen wieder in sein Wesen zuruck-zub-
ringen," in order to return the "homo human us" to the true Being, 
in order to determine the "Menschlichkeit des Menschen," the 
"humanitas" of the "homo humanus," one has to speak highly 
of the Being (Sein) and lowly of the beings (Seiende), and interrogate 
the structure which imposes the sphere of beings on the Being: 
language. 
So in Heidegger's rhetoric, humanism, in its being in time, 
in its historicity, is reduced to a philosophical and ontological 
category. That is to say, that historicity of humanism, which for 
Heidegger consists in the "renascentia romanitatis," that historic-
ity is reduced to a philosophical and ontological category. 
Humanism becomes introduced to Heidegger's concept of time 
while simultaneously being excluded from non-Heideggerian con-
cepts of time. What is eclipsed in this doubly reductionist process 
are the differences in the histories of humanisms, the specificity 
of different cultures and histories such as Italian humanism, for 
instance, and the trajectory of the various reception histories of 
the various humanisms, which include the discourses on 
humanism during the fascist period in Italy and Germany as well. 
The cultural, political, social, and economic world of Italian 
humanism, with its many levels of differentiable practices, with 
its contradictory tendencies towards cultural and political centrali-
zation and fragmentation, with its grounding role, as illustrated 
in many of the pages of Gramsci' s Quaderni, in the aborted efforts 
in the formation of the modern Italian state, that historical and 
social complexity in time is reduced, in the name of "being" and 
"time," to a philosophical category. 8 Italian humanism can only 
exist, in Heidegger's pages, qua "renascentia romanitatis," or it 
has no right to existence at all. 
It should be expected that Heidegger's authoritarian removal 
of Italian humanism from the historical map would cause some 
anxiety among supporters with ineluctable ties to Italy . So it comes 
as no surprise that Ernesto Grassi, both an ardent epigone and 
distributor of Heideggerian philosophy, as well as an insider to 
Italian humanism, would rather ambiguously watch the annihila-
tion of an entire Italian tradition . His solution to the problem is 
ingenious . In his Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism 
(1983), he argues that a correct understanding of Italian humanism 
would have to recognize the philosophical connection between 
Italian humanism and Heidegger .10 The philosophical project of 
Italian humanism was not, he contends, the neo-platonism of 
the Florence Academy, or Ficino and his acolytes, nor was it 
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Renaissance Aristoteleanism, since both adhere to a naive an-
thropomorphism, immanent values, and the rediscovery of the 
potentialities of the human being. Rather, the authentic 
philosophical project of Italian humanism focuses on the limited 
possibilities of existence. That project, which originated in the 
non-ficinian humanism of a Dante, a Boccaccio, and a Salutati, 
was then continued in the rhetorical treatises of a Tesauro and a 
Pellegrini. It culminates in Vico. "One of the central problems of 
Humanism," Grassi writes in a Heideggerian pose, "is not man, 
but the question of the original context, the horizon or 'openness' 
in which man and his world appear" (17). And he claims further : 
The amazing thing, usually overlooked, is that these problems are 
not dealt with in Humanism by means of logical speculative con-
frontation with traditional metaphysics, but rather in terms of the 
analysis and interpretation of language, especially poetic language. 
(17). 
In order to maintain his position on the selective affinities 
between Heidegger and Italian humanism, and above all on the 
pre-Heideggerian originality of Italian humanism, Grassi is ob-
liged to make three moves: first, by placing the discourses of 
Italian humanism in the order of a negative theology in the trad-
ition of Dionysius the Aeropagite and John of the Cross-that 
order which played an eminent role, next to German mysticism, 
in the formation of Heidegger's conceptuality-he silently elimi-
nates from the Italian philosophical map many other theoretical 
confrontations, such as the extensive confrontation between the 
materialist epigones of the Arab traditions (Averroes) and the 
idealist humanists who were foundational in the rhilosophical 
formation of Bruno and Galileo, as well as Vico.1 Second, by 
emphasizing a preoccupation with the relation between language 
and the thing rather than thought and the thing-by understand-
ing, that is, the relation between res and verba primarily as an 
ontological problem and not as a historical or political problem as 
to how language functions in a political and historical context-
Grassi needs to ascribe to Italian humanism a concern with on-
tological difference, a concern with the difference between "Sein" 
and the "Seiende," while eliminating from Italian humanism its 
express discourses on the relation of thought to action. And third, 
by ascribing to Italian humanism a Heideggerian understanding 
of the primacy of poetic language in the intimate experiences with 
original Being, Grassi is required to reduce diverse intellectual 
and political activities as expressed in language to poetic activities 
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concerned with the original realm of the non-logical. In short, he 
gets, perhaps understandably, carried away. While I see that the 
question of the limitations of knowledge has been a by-product 
of much of philosophy and theology in the Western tradition, and 
while I see that this question has found an expression in the 
discourses on the possibilities and limitations of language during 
Italian humanism, particularly in poetic and aesthetic theories, I 
also see that the adherence to a philosophical notion of limited 
or !imitable knowledge to which only a few select poets/priests 
have access is by far a safer device than a democratic notion of 
knowledge and action in societies where the mass of the people 
are dominated, controlled, and manipulated by aristocratic hierar-
chies. Power has, historically, usually needed legitimations, and 
Christian dogma, with its emphasis on the limited possibilities of 
existence, has played a formidable role in delimiting the realm of 
possibility for the many while exponentially expanding that realm 
of possibility for a privileged few. I am afraid that Grassi's 
Heideggerianized reductive tours de force, as understandable as 
they are in his permanent crusade against the non-metaphorical, 
non-poetical, and non-rhetorical, would have to be considerably 
emended: by Blumenberg's work on myth for one, and by Carin's 
and Gramsci' s respective work on intellectual history and the 
history of intellectuals for another. 12 It would reveal a quite differ-
ently concealed story. 
If Heidegger's "Brief iiber den Humanism us" was not particu-
larly convenient for Grassi's sense of history, its absolutist rules 
of time and causation were especially convenient for the reduc-
tionist practices of the discourse on humanism as it unfolds in 
Boundary 2. That discourse is not particularly interested in histor-
ical or cultural or conceptual or discursive reconstructions of dif-
ferent forms of humanisms, judging from the absence of even a 
minimal narrative on Italian humanism. Though the editor be-
comes indignant when an inquiry by detractors from anti-
humanism-to whom he counts the journals Critical Inquiry and 
New Literary History-is "virtually devoid of reference to the histor-
ical context out of which the ( ... ) project" emerges, it is very 
strange indeed that there is no reference to his own historical 
contextuality. 13 So a further guiding principle of the rhetoric of 
anti-humanism is its obsession with anti-history. The issue on 
"Humanism and the University" includes, as already mentioned, 
the subcategories "The Discourse of Humanism" and "The Institu-
tions of Humanism." If a reader had hoped to find a Foucauldian-
type analysis of the institutional or discursive formation of 
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humanism, that reader is in for some disappointment. Yet a critical 
study of the complex formation of the many institutions and dis-
courses on humanism, particularly as these formations relate to 
the institutional formations in the sciences and of political 
mythologies, would have been more than welcome. Indeed, 
Heidegger's interpretation of Italian humanism, for instance, as 
a historical epoch, and his concomitant philosophical rejection of 
that period, would be seen as a co~1struction based in good part 
on both an acceptance of a definition of humanism as developed 
by Burckhardt and a rejection of the validation of that definition. 
In other words, Heidegger rejects philosophically something that 
"is" on the basis of accepting that same "is" in its cultural and 
historical dimensions as established by Burckhardt. So an inquiry 
into the institutional formation of humanism would have come 
across Burckhardt' s eminently influential role in the narrative de-
sign of humanism and the Renaissance, and much would have 
been unearthed in such an archaeology: how his notion of 
humanism, a cultural entity with an emphasis on pagan values, 
individualism, affirmation of earthly values and opposition to the 
hegemonic church, how that notion posited humanism as the 
beginnings of modernity. And how, from a philosophical, univer-
sal, and hegemonic perspective, Burckhardt's understanding of 
humanism and the Renaissance has its legitimacy. It is the in-
strumentalist point of view of a cosmopolitan intellectual who 
emarginates and delegitimizes the specificity of a different history, 
and who reduces the long march towards independence, au-
tonomy, and self-determination of the Italian nation to a 
philosophical category. Difference must yield to the orthodox 
party line of universal philosophy. Yet Italian intellectuals, De 
Sanctis, for instance, and many others before and after him, such 
as Gramsci, were unable to disregard the underside of humanism, 
the fact that the nascent bourgeoisie in Italy, in spite of its produc-
tion of forms of knowledge that should provide a basis for 
philosophical ~·nd scientific modernity, was unable to enter, as 
did Spain, England, and France, a political modernity in the form 
of an absolute monarchy. 14 Italy should become a pawn in the 
hands of the superpowers of modernity, and Burckhardt's limited 
judgment of what humanism was reflects the partiality and 
interestedness of those intellectuals who speak in the name of 
interested power . 
It is perhaps not all that surprising that it should be during 
the fascist period, both in Italy and Germany , that humanism 
resurfaced next to Burckhardt as a problematical issue. A study 
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of the institutional formations of humanism, if Boundary 2 would 
have consented to such an inquiry, could hardly have avoided 
that episode as well. The German Nazi ideologies, attentive to-
wards constructing a mythology which would establish Germany 
as the heir to technological modernity while simultaneously dis-
tancing itself from the Latinity of the Romance cultural traditions, 
found humanism to be something of a nuisance. Against 
humanism (as an epoch) and for the Middle Ages, against classical 
humanism with its mythologies and for Germanic traditions with 
its thundering gods, against Latinity and for Germanity, and if 
for some reason one is indeed unable to resist the attractions of 
classical philosophy, then for Nazi's sake the Greeks, pre-socratic 
preferably, and not the Latins. The Third Reich traced its political 
and cultural roots to the Middle Ages and its spiritual roots beyond 
to the deep black forests on German terrain. Humanism was out 
of place in that pure Germanic lineage, and against humanism 
was therefore the preferred pose. Italian fascists were somewhat 
more in a bind, and the debates surrounding humanism in the 
early thirties reflect the ambiguities of that binding situation. After 
all, if, as Burckhardt had authoritatively proposed it, Italian 
humanism is the cradle of modern European civilization, then the 
inventors of that humanism, who were Italian, should proudly 
be legitimated by modern Italians. Yet concurrently, that historical 
epoch, with its economic rootedness in the pragmatic practices of 
merchants and bankers of the nascent bourgeoisie, and with its 
aspirations for a sovereign nation not above but next and compar-
able to France, Spain, and England, that cultural reconstruction 
produced a vision too small for the grand imperial designs of 
Italian fascists. So more and more effective legitimization was 
sought in the link with the medieval unity and cosmopolitanism 
of the feudal aristocracy of the Holy Roman Empire and, better 
still, with the glory that was Rome. Humanism caused some prob-
lems in the various attempts to establish continuities beyond 
periodizations, since it deviated from an authentic genealogy that 
began with the Roman Empire, prospered in the unity of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and culminated in Mussolini. Yet humanism had 
an eminently complex arsenal of symbolics to feed into the imag-
inary of subsequent times. There are images of independent and 
powerful city-states, of civil rights, of struggles against the feudal 
regime in the interest of the political power of the communal 
bourgeoisie; of permanent quests for a national language and an 
independent culture, for an autonomous ltalianity, all of which 
propitiously haunted the fascist imagination as well. It was in the 
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multiplicity of the figure of Machiavelli that the Italian discourses, 
during the fascist period, on humanism and anti-humanism, with 
their antinomies and contradictions, were neutralized and prelim-
inarily laid to rest. For Machiavelli could both afford to stand as the 
nietzscheanized strongman of Italy's inevitably destined will to-
wards a reality beyond the ethical constraints of democratic norms, 
beyond good and evil, as well as the balanced and rational rep-
resentation of a mind whose diagnosis of the specificity of the 
Italian situation, the imbalance and discrepancy between collective 
political needs and elitist cultural production, had indeed signified 
the burial of the Italian national dream. The fascist ideologues, 
required by trade, as any ideologue, to ideologically neutralize, 
appease, and control the diversity of its constituency, had proven 
their talents indeed. Machiavelli was a splendid symbolic choice, 
controlling the diversity of the cultural unconscious of fascism's 
economic power, unifying the imaginary of the petit-bourgeois 
shopowner, of the bourgeois landowners, and of the grand-
bourgeois capitalowner alike. In Machiavelli, humanism and anti-
humanism opportunity metaphorized into one. 15 
That, of course, was the mythological world of the Nazi and 
fascist ideologues, and perhaps one should not take the actors of 
Boundary 2 to task for not wanting to subject themselves to the 
fallout of that unsettling historical catastrophe. Yet their resistance 
to history, their unwillingness to place phenomena in a historical, 
in a social, in a cultural context, their propensity towards excessive 
reductionism is unsettling as well. There is much talk, on these 
pages, for instance, of "the dominant discourse" or of the "domin-
ant political structure of power," yet no attempt is made to analyze 
or provide a narrative that would explain what this "dominant 
discourse" might be. There is much talk of reproduction and legiti-
mation of texts, critics, teachers, and culture, as well as of socio-
political structures which serve the hegemonic process of the 
dominant culture, yet no narrative explains how and where a 
hegemonic process might operate. This obsession with excessive 
reductionism, this categorical refusal to differentiate and place 
events in historical contextualities, signals a psychogram that re-
presses the instabilities, fluctuations, and contingencies that is 
history . The anti-humanist struggle against humanism which 
tirelessly evokes its conscious motivations for its critical raison 
d'etre, its intransigent struggle against the powerful status quo, 
simultaneously messages an unconscious desire rhetorically aris-
ing from the deep structures of the anti-humanist texts. These 
metaphorics are marked by the clarity, simplicity, and staticity of 
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spatial geometry over and above the contingent temporalities of 
history. 
3. GEOMETRY OVER HISTORY 
So it is interesting in this anti-humanist reductionist workout 
to purview the predominant metaphorics travailing the texts. The 
master architects of this discourse, in spite of their diversity in 
interests and topical and thematic choices, reveal a grammatolog-
ical space which reduces history, the past, the present, and the 
future into two registers, what we might call the two registers of 
adjectives and prepositions. What we see is a whole series of 
adjectives before a noun "humanism," and a few prepositions, 
linked by hyphen to the same noun "humanism." A register then 
of qualifying, value-laden adjectives, of a world of contingencies, 
judgments, presuppositions, dogmas, normatives, and causation 
before the noun humanism on one side, and a register of positions, 
of place, apparently instrinsically impervious to the murky world 
of hierarchies, values, legitimation, on the other side. It looks 
something like this: 
Adjective-Noun 
Western humanism 
traditional humanism 
modern humanism 
marxist humanism 
liberal humanism 
bourgeois humanism 
Arnoldian humanism 
Jamesonian humanism 
literary humanism 
Preposition-Noun 
Pre-humanism 
Anti-humanism 
Post-humanism 
The occasional "neo" before humanism, having the disadvan-
tage of being etymologically endowed with the potentiality of 
escaping the hell of values for the pure eden of time and place, 
that "neo" suffers the worst fate of all parts of speech in this 
grammatical war of prepositions against adjectives. Caught in the 
middle ground between the two camps, it is promptly handcuffed 
to selective affinities with global "neo" activities: neo-humanists 
ipso facto neo-fascists. So whatever (or should I say, whoever) is 
wise enough to align itself with the "pre" or "post" or "anti" 
before humanism is thought to advance progressively in time, 
and whoever misses that late-twentieth-century speedy train is 
condemned to terminal regression on an interminably boring ad-
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jectival recess. Subliminal metaphors arise from the texts: inertia 
over motion, present over the past, place over value, object over 
subject, preposition over adjective. The phenomenology of the 
adjective here, to be overcome by the phenomenology of the pre-
position there. A contest between history and geometry that 
chooses as battlefield the grounds of humanism, the discourse on 
humanism as a pretext for the late-twentieth-century version of 
the subjugation of history by geometry? The metaphorical subtext 
of the discourse on humanism thus unravels a popularized version 
of Husserlian eidetic reductionism in search of the purity of 
geometrics uncontaminated by the world of history and time. It 
is as if one crosses into a time zone of the past, as if Heidegger's 
Sein und Zeit had never been written, as if the debate between 
Husserl and Heidegger had never taken place, as if Husserl had 
never written on the origins of geometry, as if Derrida had never 
written his introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry. This is 
particularly interesting since Derrida and Heidegger are more 
often than not invited to join rank and file in that destruction of 
humanism by geometrically constructive anti-humanists. 16 Late 
in the twentieth century then, and inadvertently or not, a 
metaphoric reactivating of a desire for the purity, simplicity, orig-
inality, and universality of spatial geometrics. Should the logics 
of reductionism, on its way towards an anti-humanist and beaut-
ifully symmetricized space, on its way towards geometricity and 
quantification, signal an ontic desire for a world devoid of qual-
ities, values, presuppositions, and contingencies? This imaginarily 
hierarchized registering of experience into the symbolics of 
geometry and history, of prepositions and adjectives, is a tendency 
towards privileging a viewing of, or a gazing at, the world rather 
than sensuously interacting with the world, and it is an experienc-
ing of the world on the basis of a single sense alone: the eye. The 
complexities and differentiations of experience pulsating in the 
many senses of our bodies in its interplay with the multiplicities 
of world and life structures are here, at the end of the twentieth 
century, at a historical threshold which wishes to relegate moder-
nity to the past of history, again reduced to a phenomenology 
which is epistemologically reminiscent of the beginnings, and not 
of the ends, of modernity. Should Descartes' mathematization of 
consciousness, so ardently refuted by those professing difference 
in the name of difference, carry the day after all, and profitably? 
Should this tendency towards simplicity, reduction, and geomet-
rization assist the much desired quantifiability of the unconscious 
and consciousness alike? 17 
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4. RESISTANCE TO ILLITERACY 
The current discourses, in the name of anti-humanism, 
against humanism, are posited on the ethical assumption that 
difference-multicultural, ethnic, and gender-needs to be put 
on the political, the cultural, the critical map. 18 These goals are 
noble ones. They seek affinities with a heritage of tolerance and 
differentiation, of a vision of humanity which seeks human equal-
ity because and in spite of cultural, ethnic, and sexual differences. 
Yet the methods applied in the search for differentiating practices 
enhance reduction and not differentiation. And these reductionist 
methods hardly present a challenge to the almost non-purveyable 
complexity of the present-day university, which stems from the 
complex systemic relations the university entertains, and necessar-
ily entertains, with structures that lie beyond the domain of the 
university. So a discourse on humanism and the university that 
de-socializes the university by reducing it to the "English Institute" 
and which de-historicizes humanism in accordance with Heideg-
ger's reductive definition and wholesale rejection of humanism is 
indeed no challenge to the complexity of the question of humanism 
and the university. What I consider more serious is that this reduc-
tionism in method and conceptuality has great potential to feed 
into the critical illiteracy of contemporary students already im-
mersed in a general climate of cross-cultural and political illiteracy. 
If critical illiteracy would lead to politically literate beings, and to 
democratic and participatory social action, the military-industrial-
administrative complex would no doubt divert some of its $1-
billion-a-day defense budget and put it into the run-down Amer-
ican school system, the historic countdown of which has already 
begun. This process might not have to be irreversible. On the part 
of the knowledge-exchange agency, less conceptual and methodo-
logical reduction in favor of more differentiation might help to 
reverse that process. 
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Yet the methods applied in the search for differentiating practices 
enhance reduction and not differentiation. And these reductionist 
methods hardly present a challenge to the almost non-purveyable 
complexity of the present-day university, which stems from the 
complex systemic relations the university entertains, and necessar-
ily entertains, with structures that lie beyond the domain of the 
university. So a discourse on humanism and the university that 
de-socializes the university by reducing it to the "English Institute" 
and which de-historicizes humanism in accordance with Heideg-
ger's reductive definition and wholesale rejection of humanism is 
indeed no challenge to the complexity of the question of humanism 
and the university. What I consider more serious is that this reduc-
tionism in method and conceptuality has great potential to feed 
into the critical illiteracy of contemporary students already im-
mersed in a general climate of cross-cultural and political illiteracy . 
If critical illiteracy would lead to politically literate beings, and to 
democratic and participatory social action, the military-industrial-
administrative complex would no doubt divert some of its $1 
billion-a-day defense budget and put it into the run-down Amer-
ican school system, the historic countdown of which has already 
begun. This process might not have to be irreversible. On the part 
of the knowledge-exchange agency, less conceptual and methodo-
logical reduction in favor of more differentiation might help to 
reverse that process. 
The current anti-humanists, as we have seen some of them 
in action in the 1984/85 issue of Boundary 2, surely would not want 
to see themselves as a group that says farewell to social responsi-
bility and political literacy. Yet on account of the general reductive 
critical practices they help to propagate, they are on the best way 
of doing so. What is missing, for instance, in the current anti-
humanist discourse is an analysis of what the predominant dis-
course is; of how many different and differentiable levels there 
are. How the predominant discourse in literature or English de-
partments differs from practices and discourses in other fields 
within the humanities, the social sciences, and the hard sciences, 
and what the relationship is between hegemonic fields and mar-
ginal fields; and what the relation of the university is to major 
sources of funding and wealth. These are projects that cannot be 
carried out solely by academics from the English department, no 
matter how much they claim, in the name of anti-humanism, to 
speak for the university and against humanism. In order to counter 
elitist, non-democractic practices, we need to build an alliance 
and form, next to and with intellectuals from the sciences and the 
DIFFERENT/A 88 
social sciences, a literate critical bloc. When it comes to the question 
of humanism and the university, we need the expertise of 
economists, scientists, physicists, and ecologists as well as intel-
lectuals from the so-called social sciences and humanities to 
analyze the forms of hegemony which surround us, intersect in 
us, and in which we live. This alliance might help us to analyze 
to what extent we are complicitous, to what extent we construct 
philosophies of consent to that surrounding hegemony of in-
terested power. Reductionist generalities, in methodologies and 
approach, when it comes to the university and the humanities 
are no longer in place. And perhaps it might be useful, in a final 
Weberian/Habermasian note, to remember that the apparently 
increasing decentralization in systems and sub-systems of the vari-
ous fields of knowledge-a disparity which often finds expression 
in apparent incommensurabilities and incompatibilities of theories 
and bodies of knowledge-that state of affairs might well be the 
preferred strategy for an increasingly centralizing system to pro-
fitably function, to exercise, that is, and not to exorcise, 
hegemony. 18 
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